ON THE LIMITS TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY REGULATOR
Abstract
Abstract: The article analyses the risks to the independence of regulators as a fundamental element in the liberalization of energy markets in the European Union in the light of the capture theory. Issues related to the normative aspects and current case law determining the parameters and guarantees for the independence of the regulatory authorities are studied. These are examined in the context of the current electricity price crisis and the national measures taken to address these challenges in relation to the regulated segment. Recommendations are formulated to align with good practice and with the current requirements related to the independence of the national energy regulator.
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References
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